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Abstract 
This paper analyses the tight linkages between human rights and environmental 
degradation due to sub-standard corporate conduct. It then proceeds to outline the 
development of international standards on corporate responsibility and accountability 
in relation to environmental protection, highlighting the significant level of detail and 
convergence of international standards for corporate environmental accountability. 
Against this background, the paper systematically examines instances in which 
conceptual and normative developments under international environmental law, and 
in particular under the Convention on Biological Diversity, have contributed to 
developing international standards on corporate responsibility to respect human 
rights. The paper furthers the understanding of the key concept of benefit-sharing, 
teasing out its inter-state and intra-state implications, as well as its current and 
potential applications to private companies. It concludes with some future 
perspectives on the role of benefit-sharing in the context of the green economy vis-à-
vis the environmental and human rights dimensions of corporate accountability. 
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Benefit-sharing as a Bridge between the Environmental and Human Rights 
Accountability of Multinational Corporations 
 
Elisa Morgera* 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Environmental rights were late arrivals to the body of human rights law.
1
 Conversely, 
the human rights dimension of corporate accountability
2
 has been subject to a slower 
and less sophisticated development than the environmental dimension at the 
international level.
3
 This may explain why conceptual and normative developments 
related to corporate environmental accountability in international law are increasingly 
deployed to further the human rights dimension of corporate accountability.
4
 In 
particular, the legal concept of ‘benefit-sharing’, developed under the Convention on 
Biological Diversity,
5
 appears to be increasingly called upon to bridge the 
environmental and human rights dimensions of corporate accountability, insofar as 
indigenous peoples and local communities are concerned by the negative impacts of 
corporate conduct.
6
 This chapter will investigate this little-studied phenomenon of 
cross-fertilization between international human rights and biodiversity law in relation 
to the accountability of multinational corporations. 
 
                                                        
*The author is grateful to Dr Annalisa Savaresi for her excellent research assistance and to Dr Lorenzo 
Cotula for his insightful comments on an early draft of this chapter. 
 
1 For an overview of the international debate in this regard: Report of the Independent Expert on the 
Issue of Human Rights Obligations Relating to the Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy and 
Sustainable Environment, John H. Knox, UN Doc. A/HRC/22/43, 24 December 2012. There 
environmental rights are defined as ‘rights understood to be related to environmental protection’ (ibid., 
para. 7). 
2
 For instance, a clause on human rights was only added in 2011 to the Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (hereinafter, ‘OECD 
Guidelines’), 2011 edition, available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264115415-en), which, since 
2000, has instead included a sophisticated clause on environmental protection. Generally on human 
rights and corporate accountability, see: M. K. Addo (ed.), Human Rights Standards and the 
Responsibility of Transnational Corporations (1999). 
3
 E. Morgera, Corporate Accountability in International Environmental Law (2009). 
4
 Morgera, ‘From Corporate Social Responsibility to Accountability Mechanisms’, in P. M. Dupuy and 
J. Viňuales (eds), Harnessing Foreign Investment to Promote Environmental Protection: Incentives 
and Safeguards (2013) 32. 
5
 Morgera and Tsioumani, ‘The Evolution of Benefit-sharing: Linking Biodiversity and Community 
Livelihoods’, 20 RECIEL (2010) 150. 
6
 As discussed later in this chapter, and initially identified by Morgera, ‘From Corporate Social 
Responsibility to Accountability Mechanisms’, supra note 4, at 336-7 and 349. 
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Following a brief introductory discussion of key concepts in relation to corporate 
accountability in international law, the chapter analyses the tight linkages between 
human rights and environmental degradation due to sub-standard corporate conduct. It 
then proceeds to outline the development of international standards on corporate 
responsibility and accountability in relation to environmental protection, highlighting 
the significant level of detail and convergence of international standards for corporate 
environmental accountability. Against this background, the chapter then 
systematically examines instances in which conceptual and normative developments 
under international environmental law, and in particular under the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, have contributed to developing international standards on 
corporate responsibility to respect human rights. The chapter furthers the 
understanding of the key concept of benefit-sharing, teasing out its inter-state and 
intra-state implications, as well as its current and potential applications to private 
companies. It concludes with some future perspectives on the role of benefit-sharing 
in the context of the green economy vis-à-vis the environmental and human rights 
dimensions of corporate accountability. 
 
2. Basic Concepts Related to Corporate Accountability in International Law 
 
From a socio-legal perspective, multinational enterprises take advantage of the poor 
development of global institutions for the regulation of business to experiment in 
‘regulatory arbitrage’, choosing to base their operations in countries with lax legal 
frameworks and limited or inefficient enforcement, and in ‘creative compliance’.7 The 
latter refers to private companies’ practices of circumventing the law with the aim of 
‘fall[ing] outside the ambit of disadvantageous law and beyond the reach of legal 
control.’8  In addition, multinational companies are notoriously able to influence the 
development and implementation of both national and international law through 
lobbying, negotiations, compromise and weakening of controls.
9
 Nonetheless, the law 
has increasingly been used in ‘subtle, indirect and creative ways’, notably also in the 
                                                        
7
 The concepts of ‘regulatory arbitrage’ and ‘creative compliance’ are discussed by McBarnet, 
‘Corporate Social Responsibility Beyond Law, Through Law and For Law’, in D. McBarnet, A. 
Voiculescu and T. Campbell (eds), The New Corporate Accountability: Corporate Social 
Responsibility and the Law (2007) 1. 
8
 Ibid., at 48. 
9
 Ibid., at 48. 
University of Edinburgh School of Law Research Paper 2014/13 
 
Page 3 of 33 
 
absence of government action,
10
 to shift the corporate focus from profit-maximization 
to responsibility towards a broader range of stakeholders in relation to communal 
concerns.
11
 This is ultimately seen as leading business to review its attitude to law and 
compliance, shifting from minimum compliance with the letter of the law to 
compliance with the spirit of the law.
12
 
 
These perspectives are particularly significant in the context of an analysis of the role 
of international law in defining acceptable standards and monitoring corporate 
conduct. Multinational companies often escape the control of national law because of 
the inefficacy of regulation and enforcement processes by host states over a 
subsidiary and by home States over a parent company.
13
 On the other hand, 
multinational companies are significantly protected by international investment law,
 
while they are generally not subject to corresponding international obligations.
14
 
Multinational companies sometimes also benefit from the protection of international 
human rights law: human rights standards on access to justice have in fact been 
invoked by multinational companies against states non-state parties in arbitrations 
based on bilateral investment treaties,15 and breaches of bilateral investment treaties 
have been brought before human rights bodies on similar grounds. 16  In addition, 
multinational companies can profit from the gaps in international criminal and civil 
liability regimes with respect to environmentally damaging corporate conduct.
17
  
 
                                                        
10
 Ibid., at 5. 
11
 Ibid., at 1. 
12
 Ibid., at 61. 
13
 See generally P. Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law (2007). 
14 See generally M. Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment (2004); and Maljean-
Dubois and Richard, ‘The Applicability of International Environmental Law to Private Enterprises’, 
inDupuy and Viñuales (eds), Harnessing Foreign Investment to Promote Environmental Protection, 
supra note 4, 69. 
15
 International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, Mondev International Ltd. v. USA, 
Award of 11 October 2002, ARB/(AF)/99/2, para. 144, as reported by Savaresi, ‘The International 
Human Rights Implications of the Nagoya Protocol’, in E. Morgera, M. Buck and E. Tsioumani (eds), 
The 2010 Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-sharing in Perspective: Implications for 
International Law and Implementation Challenges (2012) 53, at 72. 
16
 L. E. Peterson, Human Rights and Bilateral Investment Treaties. Mapping the Role of Human Rights 
Law within Investor-State Arbitration (2009), cited in Savaresi, supra note 15, at 72. 
17 P. Birnie, A. Boyle and C. Redgwell, International Law and the Environment,  (3rd ed., 2009), at 
326-329; Morgera, Corporate Accountability in International Law, supra note 3, ch. 3. 
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The international community has debated the need for international regulation and 
oversight of multinational companies for almost 40 years.
18
 These discussions have 
been particularly prominent in the context of international environmental law. As 
early as 1972, during the United Nations Conference on Human Development, 
discussions took place with regard to the role of business in the global protection of 
the environment and on the necessity of integrating environmental concerns into 
corporate decision-making.
19
 As a result, the preamble of the Stockholm Declaration 
made a broad reference to the environmental responsibility of business.
20
 More debate 
on the role of private companies occurred at the 1992 United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development. The resulting Agenda 21 dedicated an entire chapter 
to ‘Strengthening the Role of Business and Industry’, making reference to responsible 
entrepreneurship.
21
 In 2002, the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) 
referred for the first time to two separate concepts – corporate responsibility and 
corporate accountability.
22
 
 
Drawing a distinction between these two terms is a useful preliminary step for 
present purposes. The term ‘corporate accountability’, as endorsed by the 
international community at the WSSD, can be understood as a legitimate 
expectation that reasonable efforts will be put in place, according to international 
                                                        
18 Early attempts were undertaken in the context of the UN Economic and Social Council, which 
adopted a resolution in 1972 acknowledging the lack of an international regulatory framework for 
multinational corporations and the need to institutionalize international debate on that issue (ECOSOC 
Res. 1721 (LIII), 28 July 1972). 
19 ‘Business and the UNCED Process’, in ECOSOC, ‘Report of the Secretary-General: Follow-up to 
the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development as related to Transnational 
Corporations’ (4 March 1993) UN Doc E/C.10/1993/7, which indicated that more than 900 firms were 
involved in the preparatory process. Gleckman, ‘Transnational Corporations’ Strategic Responses to 
“Sustainable Development”’, in H. O. Bergenses, G. Parmann and Ø. B. Thommessen (eds), Green 
Globe Yearbook of International Cooperation on Environment and Development ( (1995) 95. 
20
 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, UN Doc. 
A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1(1972) , para. 7 (‘Stockholm Declaration’). 
21
 ‘Agenda 21’, in Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, UN 
Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I), 12 August 1992), Annex II, Chapter 30; ECOSOC, ‘Report of the 
Secretary-General: Follow-up to the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development as 
related to Transnational Corporations’ (4 March 1993) UN Doc E/C.10/1993/7, at n. 44, 35. 
22
 WSSD, Political Declaration, UN Doc. A/CONF.199/20, 26 August – 4 September 2002, 
Resolution 1 (‘WSSD Declaration’), paras 27 and 29; and Plan of Implementation of the World Summit 
on Sustainable Development, Resolution 2, paras 49 and 140(f). The most recent UN summit on 
environmental law and policy (the UN Conference on Sustainable Development or Rio+20, held in Rio 
de Janeiro on June 2012), did not shed any new light on these questions: see discussion in Morgera and 
Savaresi, ‘A Conceptual and Legal Perspective on the Green Economy’, 22 RECIEL (2013) 14, at 26-
27. 
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standards, by private companies23 for the protection of a certain global interest or 
the attainment of a certain internationally agreed environmental objective.24 This 
concept can be differentiated from corporate responsibility, which rather makes 
reference to the need for substantive, result-oriented standards for the conduct of 
private companies that go beyond what is required at the national level of the host 
state.25 Thus, while corporate responsibility seeks to ensure corporate contributions 
to environmental protection and more generally to sustainable development, 
corporate accountability is rather concerned with procedural steps in that direction, 
in terms of transparency, disclosure of information to the public, impact 
assessments and consultations, and grievance mechanisms. Corporate 
accountability, therefore, focuses on the means for ensuring the environmentally 
sound conduct of multinational companies on the basis of public expectations 
arising from international goals and objectives.  
 
The distinction also serves to stress that, so far, the international community has 
carefully and clearly refrained from using the term ‘corporate liability’. This points 
to the underlying understanding that international environmental law as such is not 
binding on transnational corporations and consequently cannot lead to strictly legal 
consequences.26 As a result, relevant international developments have focused not 
on issues of compensation for environmental damage, but rather on the prevention 
of multinational companies’ negative impacts on environmental human rights in 
the country in which they are operating. 
 
The UN General Assembly explicitly recognized the duality of corporate 
accountability and corporate responsibility when framing the mandate of the UN 
Special Representative on issues of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations in 
2005.
27
 Similarly to the distinction drawn above on the basis of key international 
                                                        
23
 Increasingly international practice related to corporate accountability avoids distinguishing 
multinational corporations from other business enterprises: Morgera, Corporate Accountability in 
International Law, supra note 3, at 60; see also Weissbrodt and Kruger, ‘Norms on the Responsibilities 
of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights’, 97 AJIL 
(2003) 901, at 910. 
24 Morgera, Corporate Accountability in International Law, supra note 3, at 19-22. 
25
 Ibid., at 18-18. 
26
 Ibid., at 22-24. 
27
 Commission on Human Rights, Res. 2005/69, 20 April 2005, para. 1(a) in terms of ‘identify[ing] and 
clarify[ing] standards of corporate responsibility and accountability.’ 
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documents on international environmental law, the Special Representative pointed to 
standards governing corporate ‘responsibility’ – understood as the substantive (legal, 
social or moral) obligations imposed on companies – and on corporate 
‘accountability’ – understood as the mechanisms to hold companies to their 
obligations.
28
 Accordingly, the Special Representative preferred the term ‘corporate 
responsibility’ to respect human rights,29 as a substantive standard to ‘do no harm’ 
against the framework of relevant international human rights instruments, and then 
significantly elaborated on the underlying procedural means based on the notion of 
‘due diligence’.30  The latter is defined as the ‘process whereby companies not only 
ensure compliance with national laws but also manage the risk of human rights harm 
with a view to avoiding it’, based on reasonable expectations.31 
 
Similarly, in the context of international environmental law, the international 
community has moved beyond the rejection of the idea that there are international 
legal obligations upon companies under international human rights law. Instead, it has 
recognized the ‘global standard of expected conduct for all business enterprises 
wherever they operate’ independently of states’ abilities and willingness to fulfil their 
international obligations.
32
 These international standards are in ‘the process of being 
                                                        
28
  Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue 
of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, John Ruggie: 
Mapping International Standards of Responsibility and Accountability for Corporate Acts, UN 
Doc. A/HRC/4/35, 19 February 2007,  para. 6. 
29
  Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue 
of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, John Ruggie: 
Further Steps Toward the Operationalization of the ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework, 
UN Doc. A/HRC/14/27, 9 April2010. 
30
  Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue 
of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, John Ruggie. 
Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights, UN Doc. 
A/HRC/8/35, 7 April 2008, paras 25 and 58 (the Human Rights Council recognised the need to 
operationalize the framework through Res. 8/7, 18 June 2008, para. 2).  
31
  Ibid., para. 25 (emphasis added) and its footnote. 
32
  Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, John Ruggie: Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights to Implement the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ 
Framework, UN Doc. A/HRC/17/31, 21 March2011, para. 11. (The Guiding Principles were 
endorsed by the Human Rights Council Res. 17/4, 6 July 2011, para. 1). For a critique of this 
instrument, see Kamatali, ‘The New Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights’ 
Contribution in Ending the Divisive Debate  over Human Rights Responsibilities of Companies: Is 
It Time for an ICJ Advisory Opinion?’, 20 Cardozo Journal of International and Comparative Law 
(2011-2012) 437. 
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socially constructed’33 in the face of the ‘fluid’ applicability of international legal 
principles to companies’ acts34 through the growing international activities aimed at 
standard-setting and monitoring of multinational corporations on the basis of ‘social 
expectations by States and other actors’.35 Overall, these international activities tend 
to ‘blur the lines between [what is] strictly voluntary, and mandatory’ 36  in 
international law with respect to the accepted corporate conduct to ensure respect for 
human rights. 
 
3.  Factual and Normative Linkages between Corporate Environmental 
Damage and Human Rights 
 
Both the day-to-day activities of multinational companies and major accidents or 
incidents due to corporate sub-standard practices contribute to environmental 
degradation. At the same time, the financial, technological and managerial resources 
of private companies make them influential and creative contributors to the protection 
of the environment and the sustainable use of natural resources. In that respect, they 
can significantly contribute to support states’ efforts to comply with their international 
environmental obligations.
37
 In addition, multinational corporations that depend on 
the natural capital for their long-term operations ultimately have a vested interest in 
environmental protection.  
 
Against this multi-faceted background, the connection between the environment and 
human rights in relation to corporate accountability is first and foremost factual. A 
survey conducted by the UN Special Representative on Business and Human Rights 
indicated that nearly a third of cases of alleged environmental harm had 
corresponding impacts on human rights. The right to health, life, adequate food and 
housing, minority rights to culture, as well as the right to benefit from scientific 
progress, and environmental concerns were raised with respect to all business 
                                                        
33
  Commission on Human Rights, Interim Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and other Business 
Enterprises, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/97, 22 February 2006, para. 55. 
34
  Ibid., para. 64. 
35
  Ibid., paras 44-46. 
36
  Ibid., paras 61-62. 
37
  Francioni, ‘The Private Sector and the Challenge of Implementation’, in Dupuy and Viňuales (eds), 
Harnessing Foreign Investment to Promote Environmental Protection: Incentives and Safeguards, 
supra note 4, 24, at 40. 
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sectors.
38
 Human rights violations have often been alleged before national courts 
when corporate environmental damage is the result of gross negligence or deliberate 
indifference and caused severe, long-lasting and widespread harm on people.
39
 This 
has been particularly the case of environmental degradation caused by multinational 
companies in areas traditionally occupied by indigenous peoples and local 
communities.
40
 
 
From a conceptual viewpoint, the use of human rights law and approaches to address 
corporate environmental damage facilitates tackling the power imbalances between 
corporations, governments and communities, which emerge when traditional legal 
remedies are not sufficient to redress the damage.
41
 It has been argued, for instance, 
that when corporations exercise ‘ultimate authority’ on individuals, they should be 
treated as duty bearers under human rights law. This usually occurs when states fail to 
regulate private actors because of weak government and corruption; or when 
corporations have so much power over government that they essentially control state 
decision-making.
42
 In addition, international human rights law allows international 
scrutiny of state behaviour in situations beyond the reach of international 
environmental law, which is when environmental damage is not transboundary or 
does not have global impacts on human rights.
43
 Nonetheless, neither system has 
‘proposed a systematic structure for approaching environmental harm to humans.’44 
 
                                                        
38
  Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue 
of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises - Corporations 
and Human Rights: A Survey of the Scope and Patterns of Alleged Corporate-related Human 
Rights Abuse, UN Doc. A/HRC/8/5/Add.2, 23 March2008, para. 27. 
39
  Sinden, ‘Power and Responsibility: Why Human Rights Should Address Corporate Environmental 
Wrongs’, in McBarnet et al., The New Corporate Accountability, supra note 7, 728, at 744. For an 
analysis of relevant case law, see Osofsky, ‘Learning from Environmental Justice: A New Model 
for International Environmental Rights’, 24 Stanford Environmental Law Journal (2005) 71; and 
also Morgera, Corporate Accountability in International Law, supra note 3, at 119-141. Generally 
on the legal questions arising from corporate environmental harm impacting on indigenous peoples, 
see Foster, ‘Foreign Investment and Indigenous Peoples: Options for Promoting Equilibrium 
between Economic Development and Indigenous Rights’, 33 Michigan Journal of International 
Law (2011-2012) 627. 
40
  Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People, James Anaya, UN Doc. A/HRC/12/34, 15 July2009, 
at 19-20. 
41
  Sinden, ‘Power and Responsibility: Why Human Rights Should Address Corporate Environmental 
Wrongs’,supra note 39, at 731-732 and 734. 
42
  Ibid., at 741. 
43
  Osofsky, ‘Learning from Environmental Justice: A New Model for International Environmental 
Rights’, supra note 39, at 75-76. 
44
  Ibid., at 76. 
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While these conceptual linkages have been sufficiently addressed in the literature, 
little academic attention has yet been devoted to the usefulness of international 
environmental law in addressing human rights-related concerns about corporate 
conduct. Concepts and standards developed under international environmental law, 
and also re-elaborated in the context of international developments on corporate 
environmental accountability, have been increasingly taken up in the development of 
international standards for corporate responsibility to protect human rights. The UN 
Framework on Business and Human Rights, for instance, is built on a due diligence 
process implying concepts and approaches
45
 that have been developed and/or 
significantly experimented with in the environmental sphere, notably: (i) impact 
assessment; (ii) stakeholder involvement in decision-making; and (iii) life-cycle 
management.
46
 As this chapter will discuss, recent international developments both in 
standard-setting and in monitoring of corporate conduct have further drawn on 
international environmental law, and particularly international biodiversity law, to 
flesh out the due diligence process under the UN Framework. Before turning to these, 
however, the chapter will discuss how standards for corporate environmental 
accountability can in themselves contribute to corporate respect for human rights.
47
 
 
4. The Convergence of International standards on Corporate 
Environmental Accountability and Their Relevance from a Human 
Rights Perspective 
 
While states have generally resisted the creation of an international legally binding 
instrument on corporate accountability, voluntary
48
 and soft-law international 
instruments and initiatives of inter-governmental and multi-stakeholder origin have 
                                                        
45
  Sinden ‘Power and Responsibility: Why Human Rights Should Address Corporate Environmental 
Wrongs’, supra note 39, at 14. 
46
  E. Morgera, ‘Expert Report Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights in the 
Environmental Sphere’, in Study of the Legal Framework on Human Rights and the Environment 
Applicable to European Enterprises Operating outside the European Union (European 
Commission-funded project), May 2010, at 12. The report is available online at 
http://www2.law.ed.ac.uk/euenterpriseslf/documents/files/CSREnvironment.pdf. 
47
  Morgera, ‘Human Rights Dimensions of Corporate Environmental Accountability’, in P. M. 
Dupuy, U. Petersmann, and F. Francioni (eds), Human Rights, Investment Law and Investor-State 
Arbitration (2009) 511. 
48
  This is notably the case of international public-private partnerships, which were endorsed as an 
official outcome of the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002. See Streck, ‘The 
World Summit on Sustainable Development: Partnerships as the New Tool in Environmental 
Governance’, 13 YbIEL (2003) 21; Morgera, Corporate Accountability in International 
Environmental Law, supra note 3, ch. 12. 
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proliferated to support and encourage the environmentally sound conduct of 
multinational and other companies. The inadequacy of national and international law 
to tackle corporate environmental damage and related human rights violations
49
 
motivated these developments, which have served to ‘translate’ 50  or ‘creatively 
adapt’51 international obligations drafted for and targeted to states into benchmarks to 
assess the conduct of business against agreed international environmental goals, 
objectives and principles. 
 
A series of standard-setting exercises has been put in place by various international 
organizations at various points in time. In the context of the United Nations, these 
exercises include the ill-fated UN Draft Code of Conduct for Transnational 
Corporations (UN Draft Code),
52
 negotiations for which collapsed in the early 
1990s,
53
 and the UN Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and 
Other Business Enterprises with regard to Human Rights (UN Norms).
54
 The latter 
were adopted by the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights
55
 (a body comprising independent human rights experts acting in their personal 
capacity) but not by the former UN Commission on Human Rights.
56
 The UN Norms 
thus only enjoy a level of expert legitimacy, but no political legitimization:
57
 while 
                                                        
49
   Sinden, ‘Power and Responsibility: Why Human Rights Should Address Corporate Environmental 
Wrongs’, supra note 39, at 730. 
50
  ‘Because the main principles of international environmental law are written for public rather than 
private entities, they need to be “translated’ to the private sector”’: Nollkaemper, ‘Responsibility of 
Transnational Corporations in International Environmental Law: Three Perspectives’, in G. Winter 
(ed.), Multilevel Governance of Global Environmental Change: Perspectives from Science, 
Sociology and the Law (2006) 179, at 185. 
51
   With reference to human rights law in particular: Sinden, ‘Power and Responsibility: Why Human 
Rights Should Address Corporate Environmental Wrongs’, supra note 39, at 742. 
52
  ECOSOC, Draft Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, UN Doc. E/1990/94, 12 June  
1990. 
53
  Sprote, ‘Negotiations on a United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations’, 33 
German Yearbook of International Law (1990) 331, at 339. 
54
  ECOSOC, Commentary to the Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and 
Other Business Enterprises with regard to Human Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/38/Rev.2, 
26 August 2003. 
55
  ECOSOC, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2, 26 August 
2003. 
56
  The Commission did not adopt, but only took note of the Norms, stating that they had ‘not been 
requested by the Commission and, as a draft proposal, ha[d] no legal standing, and that the Sub-
Commission should not perform any monitoring function in this regard.’ Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Related 
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/DEC/2004/116, 20 April 
2004 (2004), para. C. 
57
  See Walker’s contribution in United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, Corporate 
Social Responsibility and Development: Towards a New Agenda: Summaries of Presentations 
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they may be considered superseded by the UN Framework on Business and Human 
Rights, the UN Norms still provide useful historical indications on the cross-
fertilization of international human rights and environmental law in relation to 
corporate accountability. Relevant instruments also include the intergovernmentally 
approved and highly influential Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the partnership-
focused principles of the UN Global Compact
58
 (an initiative of the UN Secretary-
General with support from various UN bodies)
59
 and the Performance Standards of 
the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation (IFC).60  
 
From earlier and successive international discussions, a series of common standards 
have emerged that have reached a significant level of detail and acceptance at the 
international level as directly applicable to private companies.
61
 In the early 2010s, 
this trend even accelerated. On the occasion of the 2011 parallel review of the OECD 
Guidelines and the IFC Standards (motivated mostly by the need to take into account 
the adoption of the UN Framework on Business and Human Rights), further 
convergence has occurred in the procedural standards for corporate environmental 
accountability, with common substantive standards having been introduced.
62
  
 
                                                                                                                                                              
Made at the UNRISD Conference (Geneva, 17-18 November 2003), at 85, available  online  at 
http://www.unrisd.org/80256B3C005BD6AB/(httpEvents)/3B9E23F717B84550C1256E23004DA
B40?OpenDocument. 
58
The website of the Global Compact can be found at 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/Portal/Default.asp. See also United Nations Guide to the Global 
Compact: A Practical Understanding of the Vision and the Nine Principles, at 58, on file with 
author. 
59
  In time, the Global Compact received an intergovernmental endorsement through GA Res. 62/211 
(2007), ‘Towards Global Partnership’ , para. 9, and GA Res. 64/223 (2009), ‘Towards Global 
Partnership’, para. 13. The question of the intergovernmentally agreed mandate of the Global 
Compact remains open, however. See the Joint Inspection Unit, United Nations Corporate 
Partnerships,The Role and Functioning of the Global Compact, UN Doc. JIU/REP/2010/9 (2010), 
paras 13-18 and recommendation 1; and ‘A Response from the Global Compact Office’, 24 March 
2011, 
http://unglobalcompact.org/docs/news_events/9.1_news_archives/2011_03_24/gco_jiu_response.pd
f, at 2. 
60
  IFC, IFC Performance Standards on Social and Environmental Sustainability, 1 January 
2012available   at 
http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/topics_ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_site/ifc+sustainabi
lity/publications/publications_handbook_pps (‘2012 IFC Performance Standards’). 
61
  This is the main finding of Morgera, Corporate Accountability in International Environmental Law, 
supra note 3, at 200-201. 
62
  Morgera, ‘From Corporate Social Responsibility to Accountability Mechanisms’, supra note 4. 
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For present purposes, it should be emphasized that the resulting international 
standards for corporate environmental accountability already imply certain human 
rights dimensions. This is, for instance, the case of the environmental impact self-
assessment, namely the ongoing assessment, beyond legal requirements at the 
national level, of the possible environmental impacts of private companies’ activities 
before and during their operations, on the basis of scientific evidence, as well as 
communication with likely-to-be-affected communities.
63
 On the basis of such 
continuous assessment, private companies are further to elaborate environmental 
management systems to assist in controlling direct and indirect impacts on the 
environment and possibly to continually improve their environmental performance.
64
 
Through the assessment process, the human rights issues related to the conditions 
under which natural resources are acquired and processed can come into focus, 
although the full spectrum of relevant human rights issues (such as labour standards 
and working conditions) are less likely to be considered.
65
 Stakeholder engagement 
and participation in the assessment – elements common to human rights assessments66 
– also significantly contribute to integrating into the environmental self-assessments 
human rights concerns, particularly those of local and indigenous communities.
67
 
 
Corporate environmental accountability standards also include prevention (whereby 
private companies are expected to take reasonably active steps, including the 
suspension of certain activities to prevent or minimize environmental damage
68
) and 
the application of the precautionary principle (whereby, in the face of scientific 
uncertainty, private companies are further expected to undertake precautionary action 
                                                        
63
  Commentary UN Norms, supra note 54, sections (b) and (c); OECD Guidelines,supra note 2, ch. 
VI, para 3; IFC Performance Standards on Social and Environmental Sustainability, supra note 60, 
Performance Standard 1,, supra note 60, paras 5-7. 
64
  OECD Guidelines, supra note 2, chapter VI, para. 1 and Commentary on the OECD Guidelines, 
para. 60; Commentary UN Norms, supra note 55, section (g); 2012 IFC Performance Standards on 
Social and Environmental Sustainability, supra note 60, Performance Standard 1, paras 17 and 24. 
65
  However, human rights questions related to natural resources appear to be more neglected in human 
rights-focused assessments: International Business Leaders Forum, International Finance 
Corporation and UN Global Compact, Guide to Human Rights Impact Assessment and Management 
Road-Testing Draft (2007), at 29. 
66
  O. Lenzen and M. d’Engelbronner, Guide to Corporate Human Rights Impact Assessment Tools 
(2009). 
67
 International Business Leaders Forum et al., Guide to Human Rights Impact Assessment and 
Management, supra note 65, at 4 and 16. 
68
  OECD Guidelines, supra note 2, ch. VI, para 5; IFC Performance Standards on Social and 
Environmental Sustainability, supra note 60, Performance Standard 3; implicitly, Principle 10 of 
the Global Compact (Guide to the Global Compact, supra note 58, at 64); Commentary UN Norms, 
supra note 54, sections (e)-(g). 
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by taking the most cost-effective early action to prevent the occurrence of 
environmental harm, or by avoiding delays in minimizing such harm
69
). Both 
standards are alien to international human rights law, but may serve to prevent or 
contain environmental harm which would have human rights consequences.
70
 
 
Disclosure of public information,
71
 direct consultations with the public,
72
 and the 
creation of a review or appeal process for communities to express their complaints
73
 
are complementary and mutually reinforcing procedural standards. These procedural 
standards have been significantly strengthened by the 2011 reviews of the OECD 
Guidelines and of the IFC Performance Standards, although discrepancies have 
emerged in relation to the right to prior informed consent of indigenous peoples.
74
 
The OECD Guidelines emphasize good faith consultations for planning and decision-
making concerning projects or activities ‘that may significantly impact local 
communities’ such as those involving the intensive use of land and water, as well as 
disclosure of climate change and biodiversity-specific information.
75
 On the other 
hand, the IFC significantly strengthened its approach to community consultations, 
linking the need for companies to conduct ‘informed consultation’ with a specific and 
                                                        
69
 Principle 7 of the Global Compact and Guide to the Global Compact, supra note 58, at 54; OECD 
Guidelines, supra note 2, ch. VI, para. 4; UN Norms, supra note 55, section G. 
70
  Precaution has recently been invoked in the context of the reflection by the UN Special Rapporteur 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples on corporate accountability: Human Rights Council, Report of 
the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UN Doc. A/HRC/21/47, 6 July 2012, 
para. 52; and in UN Global Compact Office, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples: A Business Reference Guide, Exposure Draft, 10 December 2012, at 76, 
available at 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/issues_doc/human_rights/UNDRIP_Business_Reference_G
uide.pdf. 
71
  UN Draft Code, supra note 52, para 42; Guide to the Global Compact, supra note 58, at 58; 
Commentary UN Norms, supra note 55, sections (b) and (c); 2012 IFC Performance Standards, 
supra note 60, Performance Standard 1, para. 29; OECD Guidelines, supra note 2, ch. VI, para 2. 
72
  Guide to the Global Compact, supra note 58, at 58; OECD Guidelines, supra note 2, ch. VI, para. 
2; 2012 IFC Performance Standard, supra note 60, Performance Standard 1, paras 30-33. 
73
  2012 IFC Performance Standards, supra note 60, Performance Standard 1, para. 35. 
74
  The lack of reference to prior informed consent in the revised OECD Guidelines was criticised by 
OECD Watch, ‘OECD Watch Statement on the Update of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises: Improved Content and Scope, but Procedural Shortcomings Remain’, 25 May 2011, 
available at http://oecdwatch.org/publications-en/Publication_3675 ; and by Amnesty International, 
‘The 2010-11 Update of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises  Has Come to an End: 
The OECD Must Now Turn [in]to Effective Implementation’, 23 May 2011, available at 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/IOR30/001/2011/en/601f0e2c-a8a3-4fbc-b090-
c0abb3c51ab2/ior300012011en.pdf. 
75
  OECD Council, ‘OECD Council, ‘OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: Update 2011 – 
Note by the Secretary-General’, OECD Doc. C(2011)59, 3 May 2011, Appendix II, para II. A.14; 
OECD Council, ‘OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: Update 2011 – Commentaries’, 
OECD Doc. C(2011) 59/ADD1, 3 May 2011, paras 25 and 33. 
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express (albeit qualified) requirement for prior informed consent. Prior informed 
consent specifically needs to be obtained from IFC clients in three cases: potential 
relocation of indigenous peoples, impacts on lands and natural resources subject to 
traditional ownership or under customary use, and projects proposing to use cultural 
resources for commercial purposes.
76
 The IFC has in this connection engaged in 
‘translating’ the concept of prior informed consent for private companies: it is a good-
faith negotiation with culturally appropriate institutions representing indigenous 
peoples’ communities, with a view to reaching an agreement that is seen as legitimate 
by the majority within the community.
77
   
 
The IFC Performance Standards further clarify explicitly that ‘consent does not 
necessarily require unanimity and may be achieved even when individuals and sub-
groups explicitly disagree’.78 This appears to be in line with the understanding of 
prior informed consent proposed by the UN Special Rapporteur on indigenous 
peoples’ rights.  Prior informed consent does not provide indigenous people with a 
veto power when the state acts legitimately and faithfully in the public interest, but 
rather ‘establishes the need to frame consultation procedures in order to make every 
effort to build consensus on the part of all concerned’. 79  In addition, the IFC 
Performance Standards require, in qualified language ‘consider[ation] … where 
appropriate’ of involving representatives of affected communities in monitoring the 
effectiveness of companies’ environmental management programmes,80 coupled with 
the creation of an ‘external communications system’ that will allow companies to 
screen, assess and reply to communications from stakeholders with a view to 
continually improving their management system. The system is then subject to the 
requirement for a ‘stakeholder engagement framework’ in the event that the exact 
location of the project is unknown but the project is nonetheless reasonably expected 
to have significant impacts on local communities. When communities may be affected 
by risks of adverse impacts of the project, the following information should be 
disseminated to affected communities: purpose, nature and scale of the project; 
duration of proposed project activities; risks and potential impacts on communities 
                                                        
76
  2012 IFC Performance Standards, supra note 60, Performance Standard 1, para. 35. 
77
  Ibid., Performance Standard 7, para. 15. 
78
 Ibid. 
79
 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 
Indigenous People, UN Doc. A/HRC/12/34, supra note 40, paras 48 and 53. 
80
  2012 IFC Performance Standards, supra note 60, Performance Standard 1, para. 21. 
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and relevant elements of the management programme; envisaged stakeholder 
engagement process; and the grievance and redress mechanism.
81
 
 
These procedural standards equally target environmental protection and respect of 
human rights. What has been more difficult to determine, in the evolution of 
international standard-setting on corporate environmental accountability, is a 
substantive standard for corporate environmental responsibility. Only the IFC 
standards attempted to identify a standard such as sustainable natural resource 
management
82
 and respect for internationally protected sites.
83
 The 2011 reviews, 
however, introduced references to climate change, biodiversity and resource 
efficiency as substantive standards of corporate environmental responsibility. The 
2011 version of the OECD Guidelines did so in a more timid way, with a 
recommendation on ‘exploring and assessing ways to improve environmental 
performance’ with reference to emission reduction, efficient resource use, the 
management of toxic substances and the conservation of biodiversity.
84
 The 2011 
version of the IFC Performance Standards, on the other hand, introduced very detailed 
standards on greenhouse gas emissions,
85
 water consumption and waste reduction,
86
 
and on the protection of natural habitats and ecosystem services.
87
 These substantive 
standards of corporate environmental responsibility are particularly (albeit implicitly) 
relevant, as human rights violations or negative impacts have been increasingly 
                                                        
81
  Ibid., paras 26 and 30-31 and 38.  
82
  The earlier version of the IFC Performance Standards IFC Performance Standards on Social and 
Environmental Sustainability, 30 April 2006 (‘2006 IFC Performance Standards’), Performance 
Standard 1, fn.  7) made reference to ‘sustainable resource management’ as ‘the use, development 
and protection of resources in a way or at a rate that enables people and communities to provide for 
their present social, economic and cultural well-being while also sustaining the potential of those 
resources to meet the reasonably foreseeable needs of future generations’ (cf. 2012 IFC 
Performance Standards, supra note 60, Standard 6). 
83
  2006 IFC Performance Standards, supra note 60,  Performance Standard 6. For a more detailed 
discussion on these substantive standards, see Morgera, Corporate Accountability in International 
Environmental Law, supra note 3, ch. 8. 
84
  OECD Guidelines, chapter VI, para 6.d. 
85
  Such as ‘technical and financially feasible and cost-effective options to reduce project-related 
greenhouse gas emissions during the design and operation of the project’, as well as more specific 
obligations in case of projects expected or actually producing more than 25,000 tonnes of carbon-
dioxide equivalent annually: 2012 IFC Performance Standards, supra note 60, Performance 
Standard 3, paras 7-8.  
86
  This includes checking whether contractors for the disposal of hazardous waste are reputable and 
legitimately licensed and their sites are operated in a manner consistent with acceptable standards. 
IFC clients must also consider whether they should develop their own recovery or disposal facilities 
at the project site. Further, they are subject to the prohibition to purchase, store, manufacture, use or 
trade in products classified as extremely hazardous or highly hazardous by the World Health 
Organisation: Ibid., paras 9, 12 and 17. 
87
   Ibid., Performance Standard 6. 
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discussed internationally in relation to waste
88
 and climate change.
89
 The standards 
related to biodiversity, in turn, provide specific human rights dimensions: 
stakeholders’ views need to be taken into account on the extent of conversion or 
degradation, and the identification and protection of ‘set-aside areas’.90 Furthermore, 
business entities are called upon to determine with stakeholder participation likely 
adverse impacts on ecosystem services, and systematically identify priority ecosystem 
services (either those in relation to which the project will have adverse impacts on 
affected communities or on which the project will be directly dependent for its 
operations). These exercises are aimed at avoiding or minimizing negative impacts, 
and implementing measures to increase the resource efficiency of the operation.
91
  
 
Overall, international standards for corporate environmental accountability serve 
various functions. They enhance the process of project review by expanding the 
substantive criteria applicable to risk assessment and creating additional layers of 
corporate compliance beyond national law and possibly also beyond international 
treaties to which the host state is a party.
92
 Further, they provide additional grounds 
for stakeholders’ complaints and advocacy campaigns that would not otherwise 
appear sound at the national or international level.
93
 From the viewpoint of 
corporations, international standards have a significant and growing ‘commercial 
relevance’ in light of the increasing number of direct commitments of private 
companies to key provisions or goals of multilateral environmental agreements, and 
their direct involvement in international standard-setting on corporate environmental 
accountability.
94
 
 
 
                                                        
88
   See the reports of the UN Special Rapporteur on the adverse effects of the movement and dumping 
of toxic and dangerous products and wastes on the enjoyment of human rights: 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Environment/ToxicWastes/Pages/SRToxicWastesIndex.aspx.  
89
 Human Rights Council,  Resolutions on ‘Human Rights and Climate Change’: Res. 7/23, 28 March  
2008; Res. 10/4, 25 March 2009; and Res. 18/22, 17 October 2011. 
90
  2012 IFC Performance Standards, supra note 60, Performance Standard 6, para. 14 and fn. 10. 
91
  Ibid., paras 24-25. 
92
 Meyerstein, ‘Global Adversarial Legalism: The Private Regulation of FDI as a Species of Global 
Administrative Law’, in M. Audit & S. Schill (eds), The Internationalisation of Public Contracts 
(forthcoming 2013). 
93
 Ibid. 
94
 Affolder, ‘The Market for Treaties’, 11 Chicago Journal of International Law (2010) 159, at 186. 
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5. Cross-fertilization between Environmental and Human Rights-related 
Efforts in Ensuring Corporate Accountability 
 
Increasingly, international standard-setting and monitoring activities related to 
corporate accountability have relied on conceptual and normative developments under 
international environmental law, and in particular under the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, to further develop and effectively apply human rights-related international 
standards to multinational enterprises. In particular, the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD) has provided normative standards as well as practical tools to 
‘translate’ the concepts of sustainable use and the protection of indigenous peoples 
and local communities
95
 into workable benchmarks for the private sector. This is, in 
particular, the case of environmental-cultural impact assessments and benefit-
sharing.
96
 The CBD guidelines are particularly noteworthy because they have been 
negotiated with the participation of stakeholders and representatives of indigenous 
and local communities
97
 and approved inter-governmentally
98
 by the CBD’s virtually 
                                                        
95
 Although the soft law instruments developed under the Convention always refer to ‘indigenous and 
local communities’, the inappropriate use of this terminology to reflect international human rights 
developments related to indigenous peoples has already been pointed out by the UN Forum on 
Indigenous Issues (e.g., Report of the Tenth Session of the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, 
UN Doc. E/2011/43-E/C.19/2011/14, 16-27 May 2011, paras 26-27) but CBD parties have not yet 
reached consensus on adopting the term ‘indigenous peoples and local communities.’ The question was 
discussed most recently by the COP in 2012 and eventually postponed for consideration in 2014, 
following consideration of ‘all its implications for the Convention on Biological Diversity and its 
Parties’ (Recommendations to the Convention on Biological Diversity Arising from the Ninth and Tenth 
Sessions of the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, CBD Decision XI/14G, 5 
December2012, para. 2). 
96
 Although the concept of benefit-sharing has been enshrined in international law since the late 1950s 
(such as in the 1957 Interim Convention on Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals, as argued by 
Proelß, ‘Marine Mammals’,  in R. Wolfrum (ed.), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International 
Law (2010), available at http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-
9780199231690-e1189?rskey=t1xQHR&result=4&q=&prd=EPIL, para. 10; Convention on the Law of 
the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3, Art. 140(2); Declaration on the Right to Development, UN 
GA Res. 41/128, 4 December 1986, Art. 2(3); and the ILO Convention No. 169 Concerning Indigenous 
and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, 28 ILM (1989) 1382, Art. 15(2)), it is in the context of 
the CBD that is has been more fully developed. 
97
 Under the CBD Working Group on Art. 8(j) (‘traditional knowledge’) in particular, the fullest 
possible participation of indigenous and local communities is ensured in all Working Group meetings, 
including in contact groups, by welcoming community representatives as Friends of the Co-Chairs, 
Friends of the Bureau and Co-Chairs of contact groups; without prejudice to the applicable rules of 
procedure of the Conference of the Parties establishing that representatives duly nominated by parties 
are to conduct the business of CBD meetings so that any text proposal by indigenous and local 
communities’ representatives must be supported by at least one party. Conference of the Parties to the 
Convention on Biodiversity, Report of the Seventh Meeting of the Ad Hoc Open-ended Working Group 
on Article 8(j) and Related Provisions, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/11/7, 24 November 2011, para. 20. 
98
 By the Convention Conference of the Parties (‘COP’) – the Convention currently counts 193 States 
as parties. On the legal significance of COP decisions generally, see Brunnée, ‘COPing with Consent: 
Law-making under Multilateral Environmental Agreements’, 15 Leiden Journal of International Law 
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universal membership.
99
 In that respect, the CBD has provided quite an effective and 
timely forum where inter-governmental consensus is reached on instruments that 
promote a rights-based approach to environmental policy, including in relation to 
corporate accountability.
100
 The cross-fertilization between international biodiversity 
and human rights law can be seen as a significant contribution to ensuring substantive 
unity
101
 across different areas of international law that may be negatively affected by 
the conduct of private operators.
102
 
 
For instance, the 2012 Performance Sustainability Standards of the International 
Finance Corporation relied on the CBD and the concept of benefit-sharing as a key 
link between the right to prior informed consent of indigenous peoples
103
 and due 
diligence by private companies.
104
 Private companies are called upon to put 
mitigation measures into place, such as compensation and benefit-sharing, taking into 
account indigenous peoples’ laws, institutions and customs. Benefits may include, 
according to the preferences of the relevant indigenous peoples, culturally-appropriate 
improvement of their standard of living and livelihoods and the long-term 
sustainability of the natural resources on which they depend.
105
 Benefit-sharing is 
further envisaged where the business entity ‘intends to utilise natural resources that 
are central to the identity and livelihood of Indigenous People and their usage thereof 
exacerbates livelihood risk’.106 With specific regard to involuntary resettlement, IFC 
clients are expected to implement measures to ensure, for communities with natural 
resource-based livelihoods, the continued access to affected resources or alternative 
resources with equivalent livelihood-earning potential and accessibility. In the 
                                                                                                                                                              
(2002) 1; and on the significance of CBD COP decisions, see Morgera, ‘Far Away, So Close: A Legal 
Analysis of the Increasing Interactions between the Convention on Biological Diversity and Climate 
Change Law’, 2 Climate Law (2011) 85. 
99
 With the notable exception of the United States; see status of the CBD membership at: 
http://www.cbd.int/information/parties.shtml. 
100
 Morgera and Tsioumani, ‘Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow: Looking Afresh at the Convention on 
Biological Diversity’, 21 YbIEL (2011) 4. 
101
  P. M. Dupuy, L’unité de l'ordre juridique international (2003). 
102
 Morgera, ‘From Corporate Social Responsibility to Accountability Mechanisms’, supra note 4, at 
322. 
103
 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (‘UNDRIP’), UN GA Res. 61/295, 13 
September 2007. 
104
 In the previous version of the IFC Performance Standards the concept of benefit-sharing was only 
relied upon in the context of cultural heritage: 2006 IFC Performance Standards, supra note 82, 
Performance Standard 8. 
105
 2012 IFC Performance Standards, supra note 60, Performance Standard 7, paras 12-13. 
106
 Ibid., para. 18. 
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alternative, IFC clients are to provide compensation and benefits associated with the 
natural resource use that ‘may be collective in nature rather than directly oriented 
towards individuals and households’, taking into account the ecological context.107  
 
In parallel, the UN Rapporteur on Indigenous Peoples’ Rights pointed to the need to 
complement the UN Framework on Business and Human Rights with an 
environmental dimension to ensure the protection of the rights of indigenous 
peoples.
108
 To that end, he indicated that concepts such as benefit-sharing and socio-
cultural and environmental impact assessments, as elaborated upon under the CBD,
109
 
can significantly contribute to fleshing out standards of due diligence according to the 
UN Framework on Business and Human Rights.
110
 He also stressed that in addition to 
entitlement to compensation, indigenous peoples have a right to share in the benefits 
arising from business activities taking place on their traditional lands or in relation to 
their traditionally used natural resources.
111
 And further, consensus-driven 
consultation processes should not only address measures to mitigate or compensate 
for adverse impacts of projects, but also explore and arrive at means of equitable 
benefit-sharing in a spirit of true partnership.
112
 Along similar lines, the Expert 
Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples stressed the link between prior 
informed consent, benefit-sharing and mitigation measures in the context of large-
scale natural resource extraction on indigenous peoples’ territories, underscoring the 
importance of the CBD work programme on protected areas
113
 and the Akwé: Kon 
Guidelines on socio-cultural and environmental impact assessments.
114
  
                                                        
107
 Ibid., Performance Standard 5, para. 26. 
108
 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 
Indigenous Peoples, UN Doc. A/HRC/12/34, supra note 40, Section E. 
109
 The socio-cultural and environmental impact assessments were elaborated upon through Akwé: Kon 
Voluntary Guidelines for the Conduct of Cultural, Environmental and Social Impact Assessment 
regarding Developments Proposed to Take Place on, or Which Are Likely to Impact on, Sacred Sites 
and on Lands and Waters Traditionally Occupied or Used by Indigenous and Local Communities, 
CBD COP 7 Decision VII/16F, 13 April 2004. 
110
 Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous Peoples, James Anaya, UN Doc. A/HRC/15/37, 19 July 2010, 
paras 73-75. 
111
 Ibid., paras 76-80. 
112
 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 
Indigenous Peoples, UN Doc. A/HRC/12/34, supra note 40, paras 48 and 53. 
113
 ‘Programme of Work on Protected Areas’, in Protected Areas (Arts 8 (a) to (e)), CBD COP 
Decision VII/28, 13 April 2004, Annex. 
114
 Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Progress Report on the Study on 
Indigenous Peoples and the Right to Participate in Decision-making, UN Doc. A/HRC/15/35, 23 
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With regard to monitoring activities, the implementation procedure of the OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises has provided recent instances in which CBD 
concepts have been used to interpret the more general standards of corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights contained in the Guidelines. The UK National 
Contact Point used the CBD Akwé: Kon Guidelines to interpret the OECD Guidelines 
provisions on consultations on environmental impacts, and determined on that basis 
that a mining company did not employ the local language or means of communication 
other than the written form for consultations with communities with very high rates of 
illiteracy.
115
 Significantly, it further explicitly underlined that in carrying out a human 
rights impact assessment, as suggested by the UN Framework on Business and 
Human Rights, the Akwé: Kon Guidelines could be used as a point of reference, 
particularly for carrying out impact assessments on indigenous groups.
116
 
Confirmation of the relevance of the CBD Akwé: Kon Guidelines for the appropriate 
identification of and consultation with indigenous peoples has also emerged from 
other recommendations under the OECD Guidelines implementation procedure.
117
 
 
Benefit-sharing and socio-cultural environmental impact assessments, as developed 
under the CBD, have therefore served to tighten the link between corporate 
environmental accountability and the human rights of indigenous peoples that can be 
negatively impacted by extractive industries. They provide flexible and detailed 
procedures to uphold the recognition of indigenous peoples’ rights to self-
determination and to permanent sovereignty over their lands and resources; and to 
operationalize their right to free, prior informed consent with regard to approval of the 
use by private industries of indigenous lands, territories and resources. More uniform 
and detailed procedures in that regard appear particularly useful as ‘national practice 
remains sporadic and inconsistent’ in relation to indigenous peoples’ right to prior 
                                                                                                                                                              
August2010); and Report of the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples on Its Third 
Session, UN Doc. A/HRC/15/36, 23 August 2010. 
115
 UK NCP, Final Statement on the Complaint from Survival International against Vedanta Resources 
plc, 25 September 2009, paras 44-46, available at: http://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/43884129.pdf. 
116
 Ibid., para. 79. 
117
 Norwegian National Contact Point, Final Statement: Complaint from The Future in Our Hands 
(FIOH) against INTEX Resources ASA and the Mindoro Nickel Project, January 2012, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/internationalinvestment/guidelinesformultinationalenterprises/Norwegian%20
NCP%20intex_final.pdf, at 48. 
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informed consent.
118
 At the same time, it has been recognized that culturally 
appropriate and effective consultations
119
 and free prior informed consent are 
necessary to define arrangements for sharing benefits arising from private investments 
so as to ensure accord with indigenous peoples’ own understanding and 
preferences.
120
 
 
Benefit-sharing and socio-cultural environmental impact assessments thus appear as 
two of the interlinked procedural safeguards
121
 that underpin corporate respect for the 
substantive rights of indigenous peoples potentially or actually impacted by extractive 
activities in or near their lands. These safeguards are considered essential means for 
corporate accountability vis-à-vis the exercise of indigenous peoples’ substantive 
right to property, culture, religion and non-discrimination, their right to health and 
physical well-being, as well as their right to set and pursue their own priorities for 
development, including the development of natural resources, as part of their right to 
self-determination.
122
 In particular, socio-cultural environmental impact assessments 
constitute an indispensable precondition to the process of obtaining prior informed 
consent; whereas benefit-sharing represents the concrete outcome of that process. 
These safeguards are expected to apply to operations that take place within the 
officially recognized or customary land use areas of indigenous peoples, or to any 
extractive activity that has a direct bearing on areas of cultural significance, or on 
natural resources traditionally used by indigenous peoples, in ways that are important 
for their survival.
123
 Under these safeguards, companies are expected to defer to 
indigenous decision-making processes on terms for compensation, mitigation 
measures and benefit-sharing proportionate to the impact of the proposed 
development, with a view to leading to new business models involving genuine 
                                                        
118
 Meyerstein, supra note 92. 
119
 Human Rights Council, Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Follow-up Report 
on Indigenous Peoples and the Right to Participate in Decision-making with a Focus on Extractive 
Industries, UN Doc. A/HRC/21/55, 16 August 2012. 
120
 Ibid., para. 43; see also Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UN 
Doc. A/67/301, 13 August 20122012), para. 78. 
121
 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UN Doc. A/HRC/21/47, 
supra note 70, , paras 49-53. 
122
 The identification of substantive rights can be found in ibid., para. 50. 
123
 Ibid., para. 65. 
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partnership between private companies and indigenous peoples that are in keeping 
with indigenous peoples’ rights and priorities for development.124 
 
  
6. Benefit-sharing: The Need for Further Research 
 
While socio-cultural environmental assessments and benefit-sharing have equally 
played a role in the cross-fertilization of international biodiversity law and human 
rights in relation to corporate accountability, it is the latter concept in particular that 
deserves further attention.
125
 Benefit-sharing
126
 is employed in a variety of 
international legal instruments in relation to the environment and to human rights
127
 
for the equitable distribution of economic and non-economic benefits among states, or 
between governments and indigenous peoples and local communities. This legal 
concept, however, is still not well understood and is little-implemented
128
 as a 
regulatory approach to address environmental sustainability and equity concerns of 
developing countries and of indigenous peoples and local communities. In particular, 
benefit-sharing as a tool for corporate environmental accountability and corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights remains to be further and systematically 
explored. This section will discuss preliminary findings on the legal nature and 
practical significance of benefit-sharing in international environmental and human 
rights law with a view to identifying open questions related to corporate 
accountability.  
 
Notwithstanding the presence of benefit-sharing in various other areas of international 
law, it has received the most attention under the CBD, where this notion has been 
significantly developed through soft and hard law instruments into a comprehensive 
                                                        
124
 Ibid., para. 68. 
125
 And indeed socio-cultural environmental assessments are a means to ensure benefit-sharing, 
notably: benefit-sharing is seen as the outcome of socio-cultural environmental impact assessments as 
compensation for possible negative impacts on indigenous peoples and local communities (Akwé: Kon 
Voluntary Guidelines, supra note 109, paras 46 and 56). 
126
 I am grateful to Annalisa Savaresi and Elsa Tsioumani for their useful comments on this part of the 
chapter. 
127
 See supra note 96. 
128
 As documented for instance in 2009 in relation to protected areas, In-depth Review of the 
Implementation of the Programme of Work on Protected Areas, UN Doc. 
UNEP/CBD/SABSTTA/14/5, 14 January 2010, at 8-9. 
University of Edinburgh School of Law Research Paper 2014/13 
 
Page 23 of 33 
 
notion related to access to genetic resources
129
 as well as the creation and 
management of protected areas,
130
 the sustainable use of forests,
131
 mountain 
ecosystems
132
 and other natural resources.
133
 In all these contexts, benefit-sharing 
seeks to ensure the equitable allocation among different stakeholders (state and non-
state actors) of economic and socio-cultural and environmental advantages arising 
from the use of natural resources or from resource-related regulation. By promoting 
environmental sustainability and equity at the same time, benefit-sharing aims to 
balance the need to reward and support ‘nature stewards’ as providers of global public 
goods, to account for the special needs of developing countries and of poor and 
marginalized communities, and to allow for diverse cultural systems as a basis for 
genuine dialogue and lasting cooperation. 
 
As developed under the CBD, benefit-sharing entails two conceptually different 
dimensions: an inter-state one and an intra-state one – that is, benefit-sharing is 
understood both as a tool for ensuring equity in relations among states as such, as well 
as relations between states and indigenous peoples or local communities.
134
 As to the 
former dimension, the text of the Convention already indicates that benefit-sharing 
can be implemented through technology transfer, funding, the sharing of research 
findings, and scientific collaboration among states that provide and obtain access to 
genetic resources.
135
 Subsequent normative developments under the CBD taken as a 
whole indicate that benefit-sharing is seen more broadly as the basis for inter-state 
                                                        
129
 CBD Arts 1 and 15; and Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and Fair and Equitable 
Sharing of the Benefits Arising out of their Utilization, CBD Decision VI/24, 27 May 2002.  
130
 ‘Programme of Work on Protected Areas’, supra note 113, programme element 2 titled 
‘Governance, Participation, Equity and Benefit-Sharing’ (in particular, paras 2.1.3-2.1.5). 
131
 Expanded Programme of Work on Forest Biological Diversity, CBD COP Decision VI/22, 7-19 
April 2002, paras 13, 19(h) and 34, as well as Activities (b) and (f) under Objective 1. 
132
 Work Programme on Mountain Biodiversity, in Mountain Biological Diversity, CBD decision 
VII/27, 13 April 2004, Annex, paras 1.3.2-1.3.4, 1.3.7 and 219. 
133
 ‘Addis Ababa Principles and Guidelines for the Sustainable use of Biodiversity’, in Sustainable Use 
(Art. 10),  CBD COP Decision VII/12, 13 April 2004, Annex II; Operational Guidelines to Principle 4; 
Principles of the Ecosystem Approach, in Ecosystem approach, CBD Decision V/6, 22 June 2000, 
Annex B, Operational Guidance 2, para. 9; and ‘Refinement and Elaboration of the Ecosystem 
Approach, Based on Assessment of Experience of Parties in Implementation’, in Ecosystem Approach, 
CBD Decision VII/11, 13 April 2004, Annex I, Principle 4 and paras 2.1.3-2.1.5. 
134
 These two dimensions already emerge (albeit not very clearly) from the text of the Convention: 
compare the reference to benefit-sharing in CBD Arts 1 and 15, on the one hand, and in Art. 8(j) on the 
other. This is discussed in more detail in Morgera and Tsioumani, ‘The Evolution of Benefit Sharing’, 
supra note 5. 
135
 CBD Arts. 16, 19 and 20. This is discussed in more detail in Morgera and Tsioumani, ‘The 
Evolution of Benefit Sharing’, supra note 5, at 153-154. 
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cooperation not only at genetic level but also at ecosystem and species level.
136
 This is 
significant because benefit-sharing appears capable of operating not only in situations 
of exchange (when states have a self-interest in obtaining access to other states’ 
genetic resources),
137
 but also when states pursue cooperation in delivering a global 
benefit arising from the protection or sustainable use of biological resources that 
remain within the third state (common concern of humankind).
138
  
 
Furthermore, the normative developments under the CBD suggest that within states, 
benefit-sharing is seen by the international community not only as a reward for 
indigenous and local communities that share with governments or private entities 
traditional knowledge associated with genetic resource use.
139
 It is also seen as a 
guarantee of the full and effective participation of communities and of respect for 
their substantive rights in decision-making regarding the conservation or sustainable 
use of biological resources. It further aims to compensate the negative impacts on 
community livelihoods of natural resource development, including when foreign 
direct investment is concerned.
140
 To these ends, benefit-sharing may entail legal 
recognition of traditional ownership or access to lands, support for continued 
sustainable customary use, or opportunities for shared management of natural 
resources. It may also entail the provision of guidance (such as training or capacity-
building) to improve the environmental sustainability of community practices, and the 
                                                        
136
 Most of the academic literature has concentrated only on inter-State benefit-sharing in relation to 
access to genetic resources: e.g., Coombe, ‘Intellectual Property, Human Rights and Sovereignty: New 
Dilemmas in International Law Posed by Recognition of Indigenous Knowledge and the Conservation 
of Biodiversity’, 6 IJGLS (1998) 59; E.C. Kamau and G. Winter (eds), Genetic Resources, Traditional 
Knowledge and the Law: Solutions for Access and Benefit Sharing (2009). Non-legal scholars have 
analysed benefit-sharing as a form of redistribution politics (e.g., Hayden, ‘Taking as Giving: 
Bioscience, Exchange, and the Politics of Benefit-Sharing’, 37 Social Studies of Science (2007) 729), 
but this expansive approach has never been applied beyond access to genetic resources and has not 
been picked up by international environmental law research. 
137
 On questions of good faith under the CBD Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and 
Benefit-sharing, see E Morgera, E. Tsioumani and M. Buck, Commentary on the Nagoya Protocol on 
Access and Benefit-Sharing (Martinus Nijhoff, forthcoming). 
138
 Brunnée, ‘Common Areas, Common Heritage and Common Concern’, in D. Bodansky, J. Brunnée 
and E. Hey (eds), Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law (2007) 550. 
139
 This dimension has been significantly developed through the adoption of the Nagoya Protocol on 
Access and Benefit-sharing, which spells out the international obligations of States towards indigenous 
communities: Arts 5(1)-(2), 6(2), 7, 12 and 16. See generally, Smagadi, ‘Analysis of the Objectives of 
the Convention on Biological Diversity - Their Interrelation and Implementation Guidance for Access 
and Benefit Sharing’, 31 Colum. J. Envtl. L. (2006) 243 and Savaresi, ‘The International Human Rights 
Implications of the Nagoya Protocol’ supra note 15. 
140
 Morgera and Tsioumani, ‘The Evolution of Benefit Sharing’, supra note 5, at 159-165. 
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proactive identification of opportunities for alternative livelihoods.
141
 
 
While the distinction among/within states constitutes a useful starting point, it must be 
conceded that there are conceptual difficulties in detaching one dimension from the 
other. On the one hand, inter-state benefit-sharing may indirectly support indigenous 
peoples or local communities: this is the case of an international mechanism 
collecting payments globally and allocating funding to farmers in developing 
countries under the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture.
142
 On the other hand, intra-state benefit-sharing may involve inter-state 
relations in the form of development cooperation benefiting indigenous peoples and 
local communities.  
 
Significantly for present purposes, the role of the private sector is relevant both in 
relations among and within states,
143
 and indeed the various CBD guidelines that 
contributed to delineating the evolving notion of benefit-sharing are framed so as to 
also directly address private companies.144 As to inter-state benefit-sharing, private 
operators are expected to share benefits including through technology transfer with 
developing countries.
145
 As to intra-state benefit-sharing, private investors are 
expected to share returns with indigenous and local communities, offer job 
                                                        
141
 Ibid. 
142
  International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGR), Rome, 3 
November 2001; and ITPGR Secretariat Press Release, ‘Board of Plant Treaty Announces New 
Benefits for Farmers In 11 Developing Nations, as Efforts Heat Up To Protect Valuable Food Crops In 
Face Of Threatened Shortages, Climate Change’ (undated), available at 
<ftp://ftp.fao.org/ag/agp/planttreaty/news/news0009_en.pdf>. Morgera and Tsioumani, ‘The Evolution 
of Benefit Sharing’, supra note 5, at 158-159. 
143
 I am grateful to Dr James Harrison, University of Edinburgh School of Law, for drawing my 
attention to this point. 
144
 Although they are directed to Parties and governments, the Akwé: Kon Voluntary Guidelines, supra 
note 109 (para. 1), are expected to provide a collaborative framework for governments, indigenous and 
local communities, decision makers and managers of developments (para. 3). Addis Ababa Principles 
and Guidelines for the Sustainable Use of Biodiversity, supra note 133, para. 1 clarifies that ‘[T]he 
principles provide a framework for advising Governments, resource managers, indigenous and local 
communities, the private sector and other stakeholders about how they can ensure that their use of the 
components of biodiversity will not lead to the long-term decline of biological diversity.’ ‘International 
Guidelines for Activities Related to Sustainable Tourism Development in Vulnerable Terrestrial, 
Marine and Coastal Ecosystems and Habitats of Major Importance for Biological Diversity and 
Protected Areas, Including Fragile Riparian and Mountain Ecosystems’, in Biological Diversity and 
Tourism, CBD COP Decision VII/14, , 13 April 2004, Annex, para. 2 clarifies that the Guidelines 
provide a framework for addressing what the proponent of new tourism investment or activities should 
do to seek approval, as well as technical guidance to managers with responsibility concerning tourism 
and biodiversity.  
145
 Bonn Guidelines, supra note 129, para. 6(b). 
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opportunities to them or support co-management options.
146
 
 
Notwithstanding these significant developments, the scope and implications of 
benefit-sharing remain surprisingly unclear both in policy and in academic debates. 
State parties to the CBD agreed to launch a study on benefit-sharing in 2012.
147
 In the 
meantime, academics continue to discuss exactly what benefit-sharing entails, how it 
will apply and whether there is just one benefit-sharing concept or many.
148
 This 
uncertainty may be regarded, on the one hand, as the result of the limited academic 
reflection on the overall scope of benefit-sharing and broad implications of its 
ubiquity within and across international environmental regimes, and on the other 
hand, as the result of the fragmentation of relevant international efforts. 
 
It should thus be underlined that benefit-sharing is increasingly deployed in human 
rights case law,
149
 UN official reports and agendas on human rights,
150
 and human 
rights scholarship
151
 in connection with the need to protect indigenous peoples from 
unsustainable forms of natural resource exploitation and from environmental 
protection measures that disregard human rights. However, human rights discourse on 
benefit-sharing still appears to be at an early stage of development both in relation to 
states’ obligations to protect and promote human rights, and in relation to the 
responsibility of private companies to respect human rights. At best, human rights 
                                                        
146
 ‘Refinement and Elaboration of the Ecosystem Approach, Based on Assessment of Experience of 
Parties in Implementation’, in Ecosystem Approach, supra note 133, annotations to rationale to 
Principle 4; and International Guidelines for Activities Related to Sustainable Tourism Development, 
supra note 144, para. 23. 
147
 Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Decisions for the Eleventh 
Meeting, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/11/1/Add.2, 21 September 2012, at 55. 
148
 De Jonge, ‘What is Fair and Equitable Benefit-sharing?’, 24 Journal of Agricultural & 
Environmental Ethics (2011) , 127. 
149
 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Centre for Minority Rights Development 
(Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on Behalf of the Endorois Community v. Kenya 
(Comm. No. 276/2003), 4 February 2010; ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of 
Conventions and  Recommendations, Observations on Peru, CEACR 2009/80th Session, in ILO,  
Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and  Recommendations,  
Report III (Part 1A),  ILC.102/III(1A), 2013, at 841. 
150
 Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Indigenous Peoples and Human Rights: 
Setting a Framework for Consultation, Benefit-Sharing and Dispute Resolution, UN Doc. 
A/HRC/EMRIP/2009/5, 3 July2009; UN-Indigenous Peoples Partnership, Strategic Framework 2011-
2015 (undated), at 13, available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---
normes/documents/publication/wcms_186285.pdf; Report of the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous 
Peoples’ Rights, UN Doc. A/HRC/15/37, supra note 110. 
151
 Shelton, ‘Self-Determination in Regional Human Rights Law: From Kosovo to Cameroon’, 105 
AJIL (2011) 60; Pentassuglia, ‘Towards a Jurisprudential Articulation of Indigenous Land Rights’, 22 
EJIL (2011) 165. 
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bodies make reference to benefit-sharing guidelines elaborated in the framework of 
the CBD without much discussion. On the academic side, no in-depth study yet exists 
on the implications of the incipient cross-fertilization between the CBD and human 
rights law and on the merits of further convergence between these two branches of 
international law with respect to corporate accountability. This overlooked issue in 
the well-established debate on human rights and the environment
152
 deserves to be 
further explored in order to fully understand the theoretical and practical implications 
of substantive and procedural synergies between these two bodies of international law 
for more effective human rights and environmental protection. This understanding 
seems particularly needed for the operationalization of the UN Framework on 
Business and Human Rights.  
 
Among states, future research should assess whether, to what extent and under which 
conditions benefit-sharing can help overcome impasses between developed and 
developing countries in current multilateral environmental negotiations by favouring 
solutions to environmental challenges that facilitate consensus on an equitable 
allocation of responsibilities that takes into account economic and non-economic 
benefits. Consequently, recourse to benefit-sharing can be made among states to 
address difficulties in equitably sharing responsibilities in the light of differentiated 
capabilities of developed and developing states vis-à-vis various environmental 
challenges. In that respect, benefit-sharing could be explored in the context of the 
implementation of common but differentiated responsibility,
153
 which has emerged as 
the veritable bottleneck in the context of multilateral environmental (including 
climate) negotiations.
154
 Such understanding should also take into account instances 
in which private companies are pivotal for the fulfilment of states’ international 
                                                        
152
 E.g. A. Boyle and M. R. Anderson (eds), Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection 
(1998); Francioni, ‘International Human Rights in an Environmental Horizon’, 21 EJIL (2010) 41; 
Boyle, ‘Human Rights or Environmental Rights: A Reassessment?’, 18 Fordham Environmental Law 
Review (2007)  471; S. Kravchenko and J. Bonine, Human Rights and the Environment, (2008); D. K. 
Anton and D. Shelton, Environmental Protection and Human Rights (2012); Boyle, ‘Human Rights 
and the Environment: Where Next?’, 23 EJIL (2012) 613, and this volume, Chapter 6. 
153
 Eg, Hey, ‘Common but Differentiated Responsibilities’, in R. Wolfrum (ed.), Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2010), available at 
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-
e1568?rskey=6tAH9I&result=2&q=&prd=EPIL; L. Rajamani, Differential Treatment in International 
Law (2006); Stone, ‘Common but Differentiated Responsibilities in International Law’, 98 AJIL (2004) 
276. 
154
 Honkonen, ‘The Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibility in Post-2012 Climate 
Negotiations’, 18 RECIEL (2009) 257. 
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environmental and human rights obligations, such as in the case of access to 
technologies.  
 
Within states, future research should assess whether, to what extent and under which 
conditions benefit-sharing can contribute to ensuring respect for the human rights of 
indigenous peoples and local communities in the conservation and sustainable use of 
natural resources by governments. This understanding would be necessary to better 
frame the responsibility of private companies in respecting the rights of indigenous 
peoples and local communities in carrying out extractive and other natural resource-
based development activities.  
 
While further research should focus on international law developments on benefit-
sharing vis-à-vis the duties of governments, attention should also be turned to a 
burgeoning transnational practice that has emerged on benefit-sharing in connection 
with the use of ‘biocultural community protocols’.155 These are documents in which 
indigenous peoples and local communities articulate their values, traditional practices 
and customary law concerning environmental stewardship, based upon the protection 
afforded to them by international environmental and human rights law.
156
 Crucially, 
through such instruments, communities express their understanding of the most 
culturally and biologically appropriate form of benefit-sharing in a specific context, as 
a basis for cooperation with governments and private companies. This practice 
developed in parallel with international negotiations on benefit-sharing related to 
access to genetic resources under the CBD and eventually affected these negotiations.  
It provides a fascinating example of mutual interactions between different levels of 
environmental regulation. First, community protocols operate through the interaction 
of international law, national law and the customary law of indigenous and local 
communities. Second, these protocols are promoted by transnational networks of legal 
advisors, including from intergovernmental organizations, NGOs and bilateral 
                                                        
155
 Eg, United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Community Protocols for ABS (undated), 
available at http://www.unep.org/communityprotocols/index.asp; Jonas, Bavikatte, and Shrumm, 
‘Community Protocols and Access and Benefit Sharing’, 12 Asian Biotechnology and Dev. Rev. (2010) 
49; and a series of publications by Natural Justice, available at http://naturaljustice.org/library/our-
publications.  
156
 Morgera and Tsioumani, ‘The Evolution of Benefit-sharing’, supra note 3, at 157-158. 
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development partners supporting local communities in developing countries.
157
 Third, 
community protocols have, in a remarkably short period of time, received formal 
recognition in international law in the context of a legally binding instrument that 
addresses both inter-state and intra-state benefit-sharing.
158
  
 
A more thorough academic investigation of community protocols could help elucidate 
the interactions of the customary laws of indigenous peoples and local communities 
with international and national law on the environment and on human rights. The 
study of the role of customary laws of indigenous peoples and local communities to 
contribute to sustainability is still in its infancy, although customary laws are 
considered ‘a resource capable of inspiring innovation and legitimizing practical 
activities in the process of administering living resources and adapting to changing 
circumstances in a changing world’.159 Critically for present purposes, community 
protocols are also being used to ensure corporate accountability,
160
 and may represent 
a constructive and possibly cost-effective tool for private companies to factor in the 
linkages between environmental protection and human rights law in a specific context, 
as understood and agreed upon by the relevant indigenous peoples or local 
communities. 
 
Ultimately, future research needs to ascertain whether the translation of legal 
obligations on international biodiversity into corporate environmental accountability 
standards, and their cross-fertilization with instruments and processes related to 
corporate responsibility to respect human rights, effectively contribute to advancing 
either or both agendas,
161
 or whether there are significant risks of diluting or 
weakening international obligations in the process.
162
 Equally, it remains to be 
ascertained whether the much more developed and consolidated adjudicatory systems 
                                                        
157
 See the UNEP website on community protocols case studies, available at:  
www.unep.org/communityprotocols/casestudies.asp; and the website of a coalition of different actors 
on community protocols, available at: www.community-protocols.org/. 
158
 Nagoya Protocol, supra note 139, Arts 12 and 21. 
159
 P. Ørebech et al., The Role of Customary Law in Sustainable Development (2006). 
160
  More generally on corporate accountability and the Nagoya Protocol, see Oliva, ‘The Implications 
of the Nagoya Protocol for the Ethical Sourcing of Biodiversity’, in Morgera, Buck and Tsioumani 
(eds), The 2010 Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-sharing in Perspective, supra note 139, 371. 
161
 Note for instance the positive appraisal of the IFC Performance Standards from a human rights 
perspective by the Special Rapporteur on the Rights ofIindigenous Peoples (2012 Report, supra note 
110, para. 78). 
162
 The 2006 IFC Performance Standards, supra note 82, have been seen as weakening international 
biodiversity law by Affolder, supra note 94, at 190. 
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under international and regional human rights instruments can contribute to better 
implementation of international environmental law. This may be done through cases 
on environmental degradation which amount to human rights violations and through 
cases which concern the positive obligations of states to prevent or remedy corporate 
environmental harm.
163
 
 
 
7. Corporate Accountability and the Green Economy 
 
Conceptual and normative international legal developments related to corporate 
environmental accountability are increasingly deployed to better define and 
operationalize the corporate responsibility to respect human rights. In particular the 
legal concept of ‘benefit-sharing’ as developed under the Convention on Biological 
Diversity appears to be increasingly called upon to bridge the environmental and 
human rights dimension of corporate accountability, in particular in relation to 
indigenous peoples and local communities.
164
 Several questions, however, remain to 
be explored in that regard. 
 
The concept of benefit-sharing is also rapidly emerging in other areas of international 
environmental regulation, although its implications for the interaction between 
environmental protection, human rights law and corporate accountability are still to 
be teased out. For example, benefit-sharing has been discussed in the context of 
transboundary natural resources,
165
 especially international watercourses
166
 In 
addition, a benefit-sharing mechanism may emerge under the law of the sea, from 
current negotiations on marine genetic resources beyond areas of national 
                                                        
163
 Francioni, ‘The Private Sector and the Challenge of Implementation’, in P. M. Dupuy and J. 
Vinuales (eds), supra note 4, 24, at 36-37. 
164
 Morgera and Tsioumani, ‘The Evolution of Benefit-sharing’, supra note 3, at 165-167. The 
normative developments under the CBD (in the form of decision of its Conference of the Parties) have 
therefore provided the sufficiently precise guidance that is needed for corporate accountability: contra, 
Affolder, supra note 94, 159, who asserts that the Convention ‘is not easily translated into performance 
standards or specific project requirements.’ (at 181). 
165
 N. Schrijver, Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Balancing Rights and Duties (2008). 
166
 Wouters and Moynihan, ‘Benefit-sharing in International Water Law’, in A Rieu-Clarke and F. 
Loures (eds), The UN Watercourses Convention in Force – Strengthening International Law for 
Transboundary Water Management (2013). 
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jurisdiction.
167
 Benefit-sharing has also recently received some attention in the fight 
against climate change. In that regard, attention has predominantly focused on the 
establishment of a mechanism to reduce emissions from deforestation and degradation 
(so-called REDD+) and the need to avoid the further marginalization of vulnerable 
forest communities.
168
Other contributions have addressed benefit-sharing in 
connection with the Clean Development Mechanism, adaptation, and agriculture and 
land uses,
169
 offering some general considerations on improved equity in market-
based mechanisms to curb climate change.
170
  
 
No academic study to date, however, has attempted to develop a comprehensive and 
systematic interpretation of benefit-sharing across different international 
environmental regimes – let alone of its relevance for corporate accountability and 
human rights. There is therefore a need for scholarly attention to be directed to the 
potential of benefit-sharing as a comprehensive and flexible regulatory approach to 
operationalize equity across international environmental regimes, in particular, intra-
generational equity
171
 – equity among stakeholders of the same generation on the 
basis of self-determination, cultural diversity and maintenance of ecological 
                                                        
167
 Recommendations of the UN General Assembly’s Ad Hoc Open-ended Informal Working Group on 
Marine Biodiversity, Annex to UN Doc. A/66/119, 30 June 2011, para. 1(b), endorsed by GA Res 
66/231 (2011), para. 167. E.g. De la Fayette, ‘A New Regime for the Conservation and Sustainable Use 
of Marine Biodiversity and Genetic Resources Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction’, 24 
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law (2009) 221; Drankier et al., ‘Marine Genetic 
Resources in Areas beyond National Jurisdiction: Access and Benefit-Sharing’, 27 IJMCL (2012) 375; 
and T. Greiber, Access and Benefit Sharing in Relation to Marine Genetic Resources from Areas 
Beyond National Jurisdiction: A Possible Way Forward – Study in Preparation of the Informal 
Workshop on Conservation of Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction(2011), available at 
http://www.bfn.de/fileadmin/MDB/documents/service/Skript_301.pdf. 
168
 Baez, ‘The “Right” REDD Framework: National Laws that Best Protect Indigenous Rights in a 
Global REDD Regime’, 80 Fordham L. Rev. (2011) 821; Greenleaf, ‘Using Carbon Rights to Curb 
Deforestation and Empower Forest Communities’, 18 NYU Envtl. L.J. (2011) 507; and L. Peskett, 
Benefit-Sharing in REDD+: Exploring the Implications for Poor and Vulnerable People (2012), 
available at http://redd-net.org/files/BenefitSharingReport.pdf. 
169
 Voigt, ‘Is the Clean Development Mechanism Sustainable: Some Critical Aspects’, 8 Sustainable 
Dev. L. & Pol’y (2007) 15; Hunter, ‘The Confluence of Human Rights and the Environment: Human 
Rights Implications for Climate Change Negotiations’, 11 Or. Rev. Int’l L. (2009) 331; C. Streck., 
Towards Policies for Climate Change Mitigation: Incentives and Benefits for Smallholder 
Farmers (2012), available at http://cgspace.cgiar.org/bitstream/handle/10568/21114/ccafsreport7-
smallholder_farmer_finance.pdf. 
170
 Concerns in this regard are raised by Francioni, ‘Realism, Utopia and the Future of International 
Environmental Law’, in A. Cassese (ed.), Realizing Utopia: The Future of International Law (2012) 
442. 
171
 Bartow, Magraw and Hawke, ‘Sustainable Development’, in Bodansky, Brunnée and Hey (eds), 
Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law, supra note 138, 613, at 630. 
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integrity.
172
 The recourse to equity in an intra-generational context is more novel than 
in an inter-generational context and remains debatable in international law.
173
 In this 
respect, benefit-sharing can be explored as a cross-cutting tool for empowerment, 
participation and partnership among states, local and indigenous communities, and the 
private sector.  
 
Finally, it would appear useful to place future research on benefit-sharing within the 
policy discourse on the green economy, which emphasizes opportunities for business 
development, job creation and public-sector savings arising from environmental 
management.
174
 Among other things, the idea of the green economy also calls for a 
synergetic approach to tackling climate, biodiversity and energy crises.
175
 In that 
respect, research will determine whether benefit-sharing can work as a ‘bridge’ 
between different international regimes that tend to develop and operate without due 
consideration of other international agreements,
176
 with a view also to developing an 
understandable and workable benchmark for private companies. 
 
At the UN Conference on Environment and Development in June 2012, the 
international community encouraged a transition to a green economy.
177
 The details 
of a transition to a green economy, however, remain controversial. Fears of the 
imposition of a profit-driven and high-tech agenda for environmental management
178
 
have fuelled criticism that the promotion of a green economy may not be fair to 
developing countries that lack necessary funding and technology. Equally, the green 
economy agenda has given rise to human rights concerns about the further 
marginalization of indigenous and local communities that contribute to 
environmental conservation and management in ways that are difficult to capture in 
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purely economic terms.
179
 With respect to corporate accountability, the Rio+20 
outcome document
180
 has been generally considered ‘disappointing’ from the 
viewpoint of the protection of the rights of indigenous peoples, particularly insofar 
as it neglected to draw attention to the negative impacts of extractive industries.
181
 
Notably, the Rio+20 Summit also missed the opportunity to tightly link the UN 
Framework on Business and Human Rights with relevant global environmental 
standards and the emerging notion of the green economy.
182
 The Summit, however, 
succeeded in embedding in the concept of a green economy the need to take into 
account human rights and the specific contributions of indigenous peoples and local 
communities to environmental management as a strategy towards achieving 
sustainable development.
183
 It also clearly pointed to the role of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity to bring forward economic valuation as a tool for more 
effective environmental integration, treaty implementation and involvement of the 
private sector.
184
 Thus further normative developments under the CBD on the notion 
of economic valuation of ecosystem services should be carefully studied to 
determine whether benefit-sharing can serve to systematically implement the green 
economy as an opportunity to mainstream equity across different international 
environmental regimes, by combining a focus on economic benefits with due 
attention to non-economic (social, cultural and environmental) ones. These future 
developments may well further contribute to corporate environmental accountability 
and corporate respect for human rights. 
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